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NOTES & COMMENTS
"FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW" AND 10b-5:
THE CASE FOR CODIFICATION
"Fear and uncertainty pervade corporate and financial officers."'
Unfortunately, these grim words aptly depict the current plight of
corporate executives. The fear and hesitancy stem from the staggering
potential liability which may result when corporate officers or directors
engage in a transaction which, in some measure, involves securities.2
The precarious position of such corporate personnel was brought to
the forefront in the famous Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
proceeding instituted against the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company,3 where
certain key executives were held liable for press release misstatements
concerning the existence of an ore discovery in Ontario.4 In the midst
of the major issues of disclosure and materiality, the real controversy
arose in relation to disclosure obligations imposed upon corporate
fiduciaries who act in behalf of the corporation. This issue received
full relief in the Second Circuit decision, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,5
which presaged a new era for director liability and further emphasized
the growth of an independent corpus of "federal corporation law."0
Schoenbaum is the most outstanding recent example of the debate
concerning the existence of a federal corporation law.7 This controversy
1 SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 481 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 895
U.S. 920 (1969) (Moore, J., dissenting).
2 A. A. Sommer, Jr., a leading practitioner in securities law, has written of rule lOb-5,
the chief cause of this potential liability:
[t]here has been suggestion that the principles thus far expressed in Rule lOb-5
cases... may result in fantastic liabilities for insiders.
Sommer, Rule lOb-5: Notes for Legislation, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 1029, 1041 (1966). Scholars
have also expressed concern with the problem of potential liability. See Painter, Inside In-
formation: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule
lOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1371 (1965); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Ju-
dicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 627, 674 (1963).
3 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
4 The purpose of this note does not warrant a detailed discussion of the Texas Gulf
litigation. Comment on this case has been prolific and it is only raised here to illustrate
the problems the decision posed for corporate officers.
5 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Man-
ley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
6The concept of a "federal corporation law" is nothing new. Its origins may be
traced in Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146
(1965). For further treatment of the growth of federal law, see generally Bahlman, Rule
lob-5: The Case for its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation Law, 37 U. CIN. L. REv.
727 (1968); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964).
7Judicial cognizance of "federal corporation law" may be found in the words of
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is primarily attributable to the spate of litigation arising under the
antifraud provisions of the securities acts." These provisions, section
10(b)9 of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5'0 promulgated thereunder by the
SEC, are broad antifraud measures prohibiting deceptive devices,
schemes, untrue statements of material facts" and practices which
operate as a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. Despite the existence of express remedies, 12 private actions
Chief Judge Biggs: "It can be said fairly that the Exchange Act ... constitutes far reaching
federal substantive corporation law." McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
8 The acts referred to are the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1964), and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964). Fundamental to both acts is the
notion that a securities transaction, whether it is a purchase or a sale, should be a rational
process in which the investor can make an informed decision in light of all the relevant
facts. H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1-10 (1963).
9 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b)(1964).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-.. . (b) to use or to employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules....
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act created the Securities and Exchange Commission and granted
the Commission power to promulgate rules prohibiting deceptive devices. In essence, it
was to assure fair dealing in all securities trading practices. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) further pro-
vides that the "Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors" rules and regulations. This was to provide the SEC
with broad discretion to prevent the defrauding of stockholders. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1934).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1970). The rule reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the authority granted to it by Con-
gress in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. See note 9 supra.
11 One of the most important questions under lob-5 is the issue of materiality. With
the decline of the common-law concepts of privity and scienter, materiality remains as
one of the most important limiting doctrines of lOb-5. Address by Alan Bromberg, Prac-
tising Law Institute, First Annual Securities Regulation Institute, New York City, New
York, Nov. 6, 1969. At the heart of the materiality issue is the threshold question of just
what should be disclosed. Corporate officers are on the horns of a dilemma-must every
conceivable significant future event be disclosed or should disclosure be limited to prob-
abilities? Such questions indicate that this is an area which does not admit of a simplistic
resolution. The Second Circuit has derived a workable test of materiality:
the basic test of "materiality" . . . is whether "a reasonable man would attach im-
portance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question."
List. v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner,
382 U.S. 811 (1965), citing REsTATEmENT OF TORTS § 538 (2)(a) (1934).
12 The 1933 Act provisions providing civil relief for fraud violations are: § 11, 48 Stat.
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brought under the securities acts have invoked section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 as jurisdictional predicates. It is this anomaly - the burgeoning
number of federal cases determining the fiduciary obligations of man-
agement - that "seems to be taking over the universe gradually."' 13
THE PROBLEM: FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT
The increase of federal activity in the realm of corporate fiduciary
duties has sown the seeds of potential conflict between federal securities
laws and state law.14 To what extent should federal securities laws be
instrumental in forging the fiduciary standards of officers and directors
when their conduct relates to their own corporations? How effective is
lOb-5 as a regulator of such intracorporate conduct? What implications
are raised by the expansive growth of federal corporation law? Finally,
is lOb-5, as interpreted by the judiciary, a meaningful standard by
which corporate officials can gauge their conduct?
These questions indicate the enormous complexity of the role of a
federal remedy in this area. It is the purpose of this note to trace the
growth of lOb-5 in regulating the affairs of management and to high-
82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964) (section 11 permitted suit by purchasers
against issuers as to registered securities and liberalized the common-law concept of re-
liance); § 12(1), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77l (1) (1964); § 12(2), 48 Stat.
84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964) (§ 12(2) established liability in connection
with the sale of any security through the use of the mails or other instrument of commu-
nication in interstate commerce).
The 1934 Act contained two provisions allowing civil relief for fraud: § 9(3), 48 Stat.
890 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (3) (1964) (section 9(3) protects buyers or sellers of
securities from unscrupulous practices of dealers and brokers manipulating security prices);
§ 18(a), 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964); (section 18(a) allows one
who relied upon misleading registration statements to sue at law or in equity to recover
damages).
Both the 1933 Act and 1934 Act provided buyers and sellers with causes of action for
violations entailing fraud. However, Professor Ruder has stated that "the broad reme-
dies of rule lOb-5 are more desirable for plaintiffs than the express remedies provided by
the 1933-1934 Acts." Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations
by Implication Through Rule 10-b5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185, 193 (1964). Thus, by utilizing
10b-5, plaintiffs can successfully circumvent the limitations of the securities acts-hence,
the popularity of lOb-5 as a jurisdictional predicate.
is Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAw.
27, 34 (1969). Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the tremendous growth of rule lOb-5
in its first decision construing the rule when Justice Marshall wrote "10(b) and Rule lob-5
may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws." SEC v. National
Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969). For discussion of this entry by the Supreme Court into
the lob-5 arena, see Comment, The National Securities Case: The Supreme Court and
Rule 10b-5, 69 CoLuss. L. REv. 906 (1969).
14 One authority on state law asserted that:
The problem is not whether the parallel systems of federal and state securities
regulation are advisable, but whether such systems can accomplish their respec-
tive objectives without unnecessary duplication and without imposing an undue
burden upon legitimate business activities.
Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEO. WASH. L. Rav.
287, 290 (1959).
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light the new dimensions of federal regulation as exemplified in the
Schoenbaum decision. The growth will be traced by an analysis of the
case law applying 1Ob-5 to management's fiduciary duties.15 Then the
effect of this growth will be discussed in comparison with the common-
law and state law theories holding management liable for breaches of
fiduciary duty. The implications of a "federal corporation law" will be
examined, culminating in a discussion of the need for legislative
revision.
THE IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION - AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The existence of a private remedy for defrauded investors under
10(b) and rule lOb-5, established in the landmark decision of Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co.,16 has affected litigation in ways which could not
have been anticipated by its author. Curiously, while the court dockets
continue to grow by leaps and bounds with 1Ob-5 actions,' 7 it still
remains one of the .most elusive concepts in federal law.'8
15 This analysis will concentrate on the barriers that were erected to prevent the un-
checked growth of lOb-5 liability. Briefly, they are the purchaser-seller limitation, the de-
ception requirement and causation.
16 69 F. Supp. 512 (EP). Pa.), modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.). Pa. 1946), modified, 83
F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint in Kardon was to the
effect that they (plaintiffs) had sold securities to insiders who failed to reveal material facts
which may have influenced the plaintiffs' decision to sell, thus stating a claim cognizable
under rule lOb-5.
Judge Kirkpatrick relied on the statutory-tort theory. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 286 (1965), providing that
[t]he court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the re-
quirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose pur-
pose is found to be exclusively or in part(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded,
and(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm
results.
Despite the acceptance of a private right of action, it has been contended that since Con-
gress did not provide expressly for such a remedy, its will should be followed. An exposi-
tion of this point of view may be found in Ruder, supra note 2.
17 Practically all federal circuits have now sustained a private right of action: Jordan
Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968); Doelle v. Ireco Chems.,
391 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1968); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967);
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 970 (1967); Janigan
v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 879 (1965); Texas Continental Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d
824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961);
Hooper v. Mountain States Secs. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
814 (1961); Beury v. Beury, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955).
For extensive comment of this development, see A. BROMBERG, SECuRiTis LAwS FRAUD
-SEC Ruln lOb-5 § 2.4 (1968) [hereinafter BROMBERG]; Fleischer, supra note 6. For a list
of commentators favoring a private right of action, see Joseph, Civil Liability Under
Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 171, 177 n.38 (1964).
Is The elusive character of a lob-5 action can be demonstrated by citing the problems
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Indeed, ever mindful of the policy of deterring fraudulent prac-
tices attending securities transactions, 19 it may appropriately be said
that since Kardon the federal judiciary has desperately struggled to
define the scope of a lOb-5 action.20 The origins of the "search for
limiting"21 doctrine can be traced to the Second Circuit's decision in
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.22
Birnbaum involved a shareholder suit against the controlling
stockholder of Newport Steel, 23 alleging that, as controlling stockholder,
he sold his 40 percent stock interest at a premium attributable to the
fact that it represented a controlling interest and, hence, commanded
a higher price on the market. Plaintiffs' derivative suit charged a 1 Ob-5
violation since the directors had previously advised against a merger
with another company although the merger was purportedly a good
move for Newport shareholders.2 4 In affirming the district court's
dismissal of the complaint,25 Judge Augustus Hand enunciated what
has now achieved doctrinal status, the so-called Birnbaum Doctrine.
the courts have had with such concepts as reliance, causation, privity, scienter and materi-
ality. Each of these concepts alone deserves full treatment and a discussion of them is
beyond the scope of this note. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that these issues are
subtly woven into the problem of management's breach of a fiduciary duty. For an excel-
lent analysis of the elements of a rule lOb-5 action, see Jennings, Insider Trading in Cor-
porate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REv.
809, 816-26 (1968).
19 See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953).
20 At this juncture, it should be noted that the majority of decisions concerning the
scope of lOb-5 are decided on defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
FD. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). 15
U.S.C. Rule 12(b)(6) (1964). In this vein, Professor Bromberg has written that "the typical
lOb-5 'victory' is only a holding that a cause of action has been stated, good enough to
withstand a motion to dismiss." BROMBERG § 1.3(2), at 10.
21 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1967).
22 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
23 Mr. Feldmann, the individual defendant in Birnbaum, not only was the con-
trolling stockholder but also was president of the company and chairman of its board of
directors.
24 It must be noted, however, that when a cause of action inures to a corporation, the
primary right to decide whether to prosecute belongs to the board of directors. If a
shareholder seeks to challenge a director decision (to abstain from prosecution) through
use of a derivative suit, he is, in effect, challenging the judgment of the directors. The
most troublesome obstacle for such a shareholder to overcome is the business judgment
rule. Essentially, this rule protects the directors in the conduct of a corporation's busi-
ness and is the judicial recognition of the court's lack of authority to substitute its
judgment for that of the directors. See, e.g., Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123
N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890); Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against
Directors, 40 MIcH. L. REkv. 1125, 1128-35 (1942). This protection is afforded to directors
so as to encourage individuals to participate in management of corporate affairs. Note,
Corporate Indemnification for lob-5 Violations, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 504, 508 (1970).
Additionally, the shareholder is usually required by statute to set forth his efforts
to initiate board action. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626(c) (McKinney 1963).
25 98 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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Section 10(b) ... was directed solely at that type of misrepresenta-
tion or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement
of corporate affairs, and that Rule X-10b-5 extended protection
only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.26
These words constructed a formidable obstacle to a lOb-5 action and
set the tenor for future interpretation of the rule. In the wake of
Birnbaum,27 a consistent theme developed in the federal courts28 that
rule lOb-5 proscribed only the fraud attending a purchase or sale,29 and
was not intended to regulate acts of corporate mismanagement as
such.3 0
As previously indicated, the derivative suit is one of the most potent
weapons possessed by the shareholder.31 In this respect, Hooper v.
Mountain State Securities Corp.32 looms as one of the most significant
cases interpreting lOb-5. While presenting a classical case of promoter
fraud,3 3 the operative facts in Hooper did not present that species of
26 193 F.2d at 464 (emphasis added).
27 Birnbaum has evoked heavy criticism from all quarters. For judicial criticism, see
Judge Bonsal's opinion in Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The SEC has
also criticized the Birnbaum rationale. See Briefs for SEC as Amid Curiae, A.T. Brod & Co.
v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). Academicians and commentators have also expressed
displeasure. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule
10b-5, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 684 (1968). For a practitioner's misgivings, see The Impact of
Rule 10b-5 on the Fiduciary Obligation of a Controlling Shareholder, address by George
Bangs, Federal Bar Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 29, 1969. Despite this heavy
attack on the continued vitality of Birnbaum, the Second Circuit has never expressly
overruled it and even has recently applied it. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.,
417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d
580 (2d Cir. 1968).
In Iroquois, the previous Second Circuit decisions were sought to be reconciled and
the language in Greenstein was to the effect that Birnbaum was "still the rule at least
insofar as actions for damages are concerned." 400 F.2d at 581.
28 Contra, McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 Us.
939 (1961). In McClure, Chief Judge Biggs declared that rule lob-5 "imposes broad
fiduciary duties on management vis-A-vis the corporation and its individual stockholders."
Id. at 834.
29 The definitions of "purchase" and "sale" are contained in 15 U.S.C. § 78c, a(13),
(14) (1964).
30 A detailed analysis of the "purchaser-seller" limitation is beyond the scope of this
note. For a recent study assessing the Birnbaum doctrine, see Patton, The "Purchase or
Sale" Restriction of SEC Rule lOb-5-Judicial Extension of a Federal Remedy, 18 CATH.
U.L. REv. 463 (1969). See also Note, "Purchase or Sale" Under SEC Rule 10b.5, 83 HArv.
L. REv. 252 (1969).
31 See discussion at note 24 supra.
32282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
83 The facts in Hooper are relatively simple: defendants were members of corporate
management, who, through false representations, misled the corporation into issuing its
1970]
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fraud generally associated with the sale of securities, but rather involved
the adequacy of consideration received by the corporation. In holding
the transaction a "sale" 34 within the limits of Birnbaum, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit provided further impetus for derivative
suits under the rule, thus representing a crucial step in the rise of 1 Ob-5
litigation. The thrust of the Hooper rationale is to expand investor pro-
tection and insulate against impairment of the corporate decision-mak-
ing process due to the deception of trusted agents.A5 Thus, the problem
posed for the judiciary was how to treat breaches of fiduciary duty by
corporate management, traditionally the domain of state law. For many
years, the Second Circuit,3 6 influenced by the stringencies of Birnbaum,
evinced a cautious skepticism in grappling with instances of corporate
mismanagement.
In light of this reliance upon Birnbaum, there gradually grew a need
for a thorough explanation of the type of relationship between a
securities transaction 37 and the acts of management misconduct which
would necessarily create 1Ob-5 liability. The Second Circuit, in at-
tempting to clarify the area, only succeeded in adding to the confusion
with two apparently conflicting decisions.
Within a very short time span 3 8 the Second Circuit decided Ruckle
v. Roto American Corp.39 and O'Neill v. Maytag.40 The many attempts
at reconciling these decisions,41 and the disparate views which they
reflect, have resulted in uncertainty for those who hold key positions
within the corporate framework. In Ruckle, a complaint was held to
state a claim under 1Ob-5 which alleged that the corporation had
stock in return for spurious assets. The significance of Hooper lies in the fact that it
held that a corporation issuing its own shares was a seller.
34 Cases holding that a corporation purchasing worthless assets to be a buyer are:
Rogen v. Ilikon, 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler, 819 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963).
35282 F.2d at 206-07.
36 Since it is the federal appellate court for New York City, the financial capital of
the world, the Second Circuit is, undoubtedly, the most influential circuit in the realm
of "federal corporation law." Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Expanding Concepts of Corporate
Disclosure Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 48 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 655, 685 (1969).
37 The Birnbaum doctrine mandates that there be a fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. The definitions of "purchase" and "sale" have expanded and
the Southern District Court of New York has ruled that it is unnecessary to prove a con-
summated purchase or sale of securities in order to invoke lOb-S. Commerce Reporting Co.
v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For discussion of the Commerce case,
see Note, Inroads on the Necessity for a Consummated Purchase or Sale Under Rule
lob-5, 1969 DUKE L.J. 849.
38 Ruckle was decided on Dec. 4, 1964 and O'Neill on Dec. 29, 1964.
39 389 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
40 839 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
41 See, e.g., 6 L. Loss, SEcuRIT REGULATION 8637 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter Loss];
Fleischer, supra note 6, at 1164-66.
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fraudulently issued 75,000 shares to insiders42 through the failure of
a majority of directors to disclose to the other directors (a minority of
the board) material facts concerning the transaction.4 3 The fact that it
occurred within the corporate structure did not prevent the invocation
of rule lOb-5 and the court permitted the derivative suit. What is more
vital to the development of a federal regulatory scheme is the court's
dicta in Ruckle referring to the expansive scope of lOb-5:
We note at the outset that in other contexts, such as embezzlement
and conflict of interest, a majority or even the entire board of
directors may be held to have defrauded their corporation.44
In light of the Ruckle holding,45 and more particularly, in light
of the above quoted dicta, the result reached in O'Neill posed consider-
able consternation - among judges and commentators alike.
In O'Neill, plaintiff, a shareholder of National Airlines, brought
a derivative action on behalf of National against its directors and also
against Pan American World Airways, Inc., alleging that the exchange
of stock between Pan American and National in compliance with a
CAB directive was at a ratio highly unfavorable to National. 46 The
plaintiff accused the defendant directors of paying a premium when the
stock was reexchanged so as to retain their control of National.
(Significantly, all the directors participated in the transaction -each
possessing full knowledge of all the material facts.) In affirming the
district court's dismissal of the 1Ob-5 allegation,4 7 Chief Judge Lum-
42 The term "insider" is used throughout the text. Insider connotes more than a
director, officer or controlling stockholder. The most lucid insight of an insider may be
found in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961), wherein, discussing the obligation
to disclose relevant information, the Commission said:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements: first, the existence of
a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
43 The material facts were held to be: the latest financial statements of the corpora-
tion and "information pertinent to a proposed stock issuance." 339 F.2d at 27.
44 Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
45 Accord, Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Heilbrunn v.
Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In Heilbrunn, it was held
that a corporation may be defrauded when all its directors know the material facts- and
such knowledge does not preclude shareholder relief on any imputation theory based on
agency principles. As will be seen, agency principles were at the core of the O'Neill
rationale. In Weitzen, Judge Bonsai, after distinguishing O'Neill on its facts, held that
under certain circumstances, it is possible for all directors to defraud a corporation.
271 F. Supp. at 620-22.
46 National and Pan American had cross-owned 400,000 shares of stock, each issuing
the shares to a trustee. However, the Civil Aeronautics Board found such cross-ownership
violative of the public interests, and ordered them either to resell or reexhange the stock.
339 F.2d at 766.
47220 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). In finding for the defendants, District Judge
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bard, relying upon the Birnbaum rationale,48 declared "no cause of
action is stated under Rule lOb-5 unless there is an allegation of facts
amounting to deception."4 9 While recognizing that a corporation's
ordinary remedy against directors acting adversely to its interest would
be under state law,50 the thrust of O'Neill is to the effect that deception
must be practiced upon the aggrieved party in some manner for rule
1Ob-5 to come into play,5' and mere concealment of improper motives,
without more, is not a material omission under rule lOb-5. For as em-
phasized in Ruckle, the thrust of rule lOb-5 is directed at misrepresenta-
tion or omission of material facts relating to the value of securities.52
Since in O'Neill, all relevant material facts were known to the entire
board, 13 to require disclosure of motive would not necessarily maintain
the integrity of the securities market.
Upon examining the underlying philosophy of federal securities
laws, the distinction made by the Second Circuit between Ruckle and
O'Neill is difficult to justify. As Professor Loss has suggested, the hold-
ings of these two cases approximate an untenable distinction between
false statements and complete nondisclosure.54 Simply, then, O'Neill
McLean stated that conduct which violates rule lOb-5 "must amount to either fraud
or deceit" or intentional misrepresentations of material facts. Id. at 239. See also
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); 3 Loss 1764-65.
48 See notes 22-50 and accompanying text supra.
49 339 F.2d at 768.
5o See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Commonwealth Title Ins.
& Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 A. 77 (1900).
51 Accord, Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (a complaint merely
alleging a breach of a common-law fiduciary duty is not cognizable in federal courts);
Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (merely alleging is-
suance of stock to interested directors for inadequate consideration did not state a claim
under lOb-5); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965) (a failure to
reveal to the stockholders that the purpose of a repurchase of stock was to preserve
insiders' control did not constitute a sufficient allegation to establish the requirement of
deception as mandated by O'Neill). But see Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1969) (allegation of a scheme whereby officers purchased shares at a low price and later
sold them to the corporation at a higher one may give rise to a lOb-5 claim); Pappas
v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (requisite deception found by viewing the fraud as
though the independent stockholders were standing in the place of the defrauded
corporate entity); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967) (issuance of securities at an excessive price in
order to promote a personal interest of directors is a valid claim under rule lOb-5).
52 See discussion of materiality, note 11 supra.
53 One possible interpretation of the ratio decidendi of O'Neill is that since all the
directors possessed the relevant information, the corporation cannot be defrauded under
rules of agency whereby the knowledge of the agents is imputed to the principal. 3
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 790 (1965). However,
when directors act adversely to the interests of the corporation, the imputation doctrine is
generally not applied. Id. § 819. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282(l) (1958).
A principal is not affected by the knowledge of an agent in a transaction in
which the agent secretly is acting adversely to the principal and entirely for his
own or another's purposes....
546 Loss 8637.
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can be reduced to the proposition that a derivative suit cannot be
maintained in the absence of a showing of some form of deception,
further illustrating the Second Circuit's restraint in applying lOb-5 in
cases where plaintiffs merely allege fraudulent mismanagement or
breach of fiduciary duty.
The real problem of the Ruckle-O'Neill conflict subsists in the fact
that no concrete definition of deception was articulated. Clearly,
O'Neill does not hold that mismanagement is never actionable under
rule lOb-5; indeed an action is maintainable upon any allegation of
deceit. Since the court failed to define the deception necessary for
management to incur liability under lOb-5, the years subsequent to
these decisions have witnessed a discordant growth in federal regu-
lation. The progeny of Ruckle and O'Neill have followed divergent
paths, further evidencing the difficulty in establishing the exact pur-
view of 10b-5.
In Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 5 plaintiff's derivative suit alleged
that defendant's proxy statements contained material omissions of
fact, which had induced the minority shareholders to sell for less
than the full value of the stock.56 The court emphasized the fact that
the defendant controlled more than 73 percent of the stock and could
have carried out the proposed transaction regardless of any minority
opposition. As a result, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed and causa-
tion was formulated as a third obstacle to the successful invocation of
rule 10b-5.57
The Barnett result is to be compared with the decision reached in
Hoover v. A llen, 8 wherein plaintiff's derivative suit alleged that defen-
dants caused the corporation to make misleading statements to the
shareholders, thereby fraudulently inducing the stockholders to sell
their shares to the defendant directors. (Ostensibly, this sale was en-
gineered to give defendants control of the corporation.) Subsequent
55 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
56 Purchases and sales of shares may also involve the solicitation of a proxy -hence,
the apparent overlap between rule lOb-5 and section 14 of the 1934 Act -the section which
regulates proxies. The proxy rules also contain prohibitions against misleading statements
and the language closely resembles that of rule lob-5. The landmark case upholding a
derivative action to block a merger carried out by a misleading proxy statement is
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). For a discussion of the interrelationships of
rule lOb-5 and the proxy rules, see Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The
Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332, 358-66 (1969).
57 Accord, List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor.
List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Contra, Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969); Weber
v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Laurenzano v. Finbender, 264 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
58241 F. Supp. 213 (SM.N.Y. 1965).
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to assuming control, the defendants allegedly committed acts of mis-
management which resulted in the diminution of corporate assets. In
dismissing the complaint, 9 the court refused to view the corporation
as the victim of the fraud,60 and held that directors who acquire con-
trol by means of fraud and then perpetrate acts of corporate waste are
unaccountable under lOb-5. 61
To alleviate fears of a large influx of federal claims, the court thus
followed the Barnett proximate cause requirement and mandated that
legally redressable injury to the corporation be demonstrated in the
assertion of a IOb-5 cause of claim. It is noteworthy, in this context,
that in Hoover, District Judge Herlands opined that had a fraudulent
scheme been pleaded in O'Neill, the claimant would have asserted an
actionable claim.62 The court justified this opinion by saying that a
distinction must be made between injuries independent of acquiring
and injuries following the acquisition of control (Hoover). It will be
recalled that in Ruckle the fact that a minority of the board of direc-
tors was deceived was not dispositive of the plaintiff's claims and a
similar result was reached in Globus, Inc. v. Jaroif.63
59 Since the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint was acts of corporate waste by the
directors, to sustain the complaint would have thrust the federal government into the
regulation of the daily affairs of corporate management. Such an allegation of waste is
a typical common-law charge of breach of fiduciary duty and the sale of securities is only
incidental to the major mismanagement issue covered by state law. Accord, Lester v. Preco
Indus., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (rule 10b-5 complaint charging corporate
waste dismissed).
60 241 F. Supp. at 227.
61 Id. at 228.
62 Id. at 227-28. The point made by Judge Herlands is contentious. For even if the
plaintiff had alleged deception, the O'Neill court still might have denied a right of action,
determined to maintain a "hands-off" policy in the corporate mismanagement area and
thus cling to the Birnbaum rationale. As one commentator has expressed it, the
deception "present in O'Neill is not of the type that Congress intended to deal with .. "
Comment, Shareholder's Derivative Suit to Enforce a Corporate Right of Action Under
SEC Rule 10b-5, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 578, 584 (1966).
63 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Globus, a derivative suit initiated by minority
shareholders was sustained largely upon the Ruckle rationale. Additionally, the court
adopted the "decision-making body" theory as articulated in Simon v. New Haven Board
& Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966). In Simon, plaintiff alleged a merger
transaction contravened lOb-5 in that more than the fair value of the stock was allowed in
the merger. The thrust of the defense was since the directors of both "buyer" and "seller"
knew all the material facts, no one was deceived. The court saw no merit in the
defendant's contentions and found misleading statements in the proxy materials con-
cerning the assets of the proposed acquiree were violative of lOb-5. Such statements
deceived the corporation, in that, the stockholders as "decision-making body" were
deceived. "All information reasonably relevant to a rational investment must be disclosed
to the decision-making body, whether that body be composed of directors, officers or share-
holders of the corporation." Id. at 299. Cf. Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504-05
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Kaminsky there was language to the effect that if the decision-making
body fails to protect the shareholder's interests, it would be conceivable that such action
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SECOND CIRCUnT - INROADS ON O'NEILL
After O'Neill, there followed a trilogy of cases in the Second
Circuit which did much to undermine the restrictions of Birnbaum and
O'Neill. In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 4 the court went far to find
the deception necessary to impose liability under lOb-5, thus applying
the new federal corporate law to embrace minority shareholders. The
court in Vine held that as a result of a short form merger, 5 plaintiff
was a forced seller and hence a party to the sale. 6 The significance of
Vine lies in the court's rejection of the defendant's contention that
the deception did not relate to the plaintiff but only to the shareholders
who actually sold their stock. The court found that the deception was
part of a larger scheme to defraud the selling shareholders and did not
require plaintiff to sell his stock in order to bring an action under
the rule. While Vine can be viewed as a serious crack in the Birnbaum
wall, 67 it is noteworthy for its demonstration of the court's receptive-
ness to an expansive definition of deception.
Further evidencing a judicial predilection to such an expansive
definition of deception is A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow.0 s In Brod, a
broker had alleged that defendants had ordered securities with the
intention of paying for them only if their market value increased. 0
District Court Judge Bonsal dismissed the complaint stating "[p]lain-
tiff is not an investor, and no fraud is alleged as to the investment value
of the securities nor any fraud usually associated with the sale or pur-
chase of securities." 70 In reversing, the Second Circuit evinced a more
would constitute a breach of state-imposed fiduciary obligation albeit no federal law is
violated.
64 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
'5 A short form merger allows a parent corporation which owns a specified percentage
of the subsidiary's outstanding stock to merge with the subsidiary without the approval
of the shareholders whose stock is being converted into securities of the parent corporation.
Thus, any shares which remain outstanding are converted into the shares of the sur-
viving corporation. See N.Y. Bus. Corn'. LAW § 905 (1INcKinney 1963) wherein the required
percentage is set out as 95 percent. Cf. Mader v. Armell, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968). For
treatment of mergers as satisfying the "purchase or sale" requirement of the statute, see
4 Loss 2563-65.
06 374 F.2d at 634-35. Accord, Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp.
369 (D. Del. 1965).
67 The thrust of the Birnbaum decision was the "purchaser-seller" limitation. While
cases like Voege and Vine can be interpreted as impairing the Birnbaurm doctrine, they
can be also viewed as indicia of the court's increased awareness of the predicament of
minority shareholders.
60 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
69 This practice has been called free-riding. It involves the purchase of shares of a new
issue at the public offering price. If the securities subsequently sell at a price in excess of
the offering price, the purchaser has realized a gain without ever paying for the securities.
Such a practice is permissible under credit regulations which allow four to seven days for
payment. Bloomenthal, supra note 56, at 342-43.
70 375 F.2d at 396.
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liberal attitude toward applying lOb-5. 71 While Brod should be con-
fined to its own factual setting, its rationale has generated far-reaching
tremors in the regulation of corporate mismanagement. Of particular
significance is the court's language permitting the complaint:
We believe that 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit all fraudulent
schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of
fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical
methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws.72
To apply such reasoning to mismanagement opens the door to a wide
variety of claims - claims which previously would have been dismissed
because of failure to meet the O'Neill requirement of deception. Once
again, however, we see the court's reluctance to elaborate as to the
kind of deceit which will definitely be actionable. This failure to
articulate led to the surprising result reached in the district court case
Entel v. Allen,73 the last of the trilogy.
In Entel, strong doubts were cast upon the validity of O'Neill.
Essentially, plaintiff's complaint alleged that insiders had violated
their duty to the corporation. The facts in Entel are complicated but
what was primarily involved was director mismanagement. Directors
of Atlas, which owned Northeast Airlines, were allegedly influenced by
Howard Hughes, who owned Toolco and 10 percent of Atlas, to sell
Northeast to Toolco for an inadequate price. Plaintiffs, Atlas share-
holders, thus brought suit alleging that Hughes had breached his
fiduciary duty to Atlas by permitting the sale for an inadequate con-
sideration.
Reversing himself on reargument, 74 Judge Bonsal held that inso-
far as Vine and Brod had virtually eliminated the deception require-
ment of O'Neill, 1Ob-5 provided protection against "an undisclosed
scheme to breach State corporate fiduciary law."75 Thus, the danger
of applying the Brod rationale to cases involving mismanagement came
to bear in Entel, and, while it is highly questionable whether such
reasoning should be so applied,7 the conflict with state law is readily
apparent.
Other circuit courts, not constrained by the Birnbaum and O'Neill
71 The panel in the Brod case was composed of Circuit Court Judges Anderson,
Feinberg and Kaufman.
72 375 F.2d at 397.
73 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
74 Id. at 70-71.
75 Id. at 70.
76 For criticism of Judge Bonsal's interpretation of the Brod and Vine holdings, see
42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 978, 982-83 (1967).
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decisions have evidenced a more liberal attitude toward redressing
shareholder claims involving breach of a fiduciary duty. Dasho v. Sus-
quehanna Corp.7 7 is worthy of note for its interpretation of the Ruckle-
O'Neill paradox. In Dasho, plaintiff alleged that the defendant officers
and directors defrauded the corporation in a merger which involved
the subsequent reacquisition of the corporation's stock at inflated
prices. Circuit Judge Fairchild, in his concurring opinion, addressing
himself to the issue of "[m]isuse of director's power as fraud" 8 probed
the possible material differences between Ruckle (majority participa-
tion in the fraud) and O'Neill (unanimous wrongdoing), and con-
cluded that
the failure of the defendant directors to perform their duty pre-
sumably injured the corporation, and I do not believe it is sound to
differentiate between situations where the directors were unani-
mous in wrongdoing and those where less than all were involved.79
The Seventh Circuit thus displayed serious misgivings for the Second
Circuit's early mandate that the knowledge of the agents be imputed to
the principal - the basis of the O'Neill result.80
The Third Circuit's venture into the realm of corporate mis-
management was in Pappas v. Moss,81 where shareholders in a derivative
suit alleged that the directors had authorized an issuance of shares to
themselves and outsiders at depressed prices.82 While the resolution did
not require stockholder approval, the directors, nevertheless, sought the
ratification of the shareholders. It was misrepresentations and fraud
contained in the resolution which plaintiff charged was violative of the
federal securities laws.83 The defendants contended that since a corpora-
tion can act only through its agents and, here, all agents knew the rele-
vant facts, no deception of the corporation could be found. The court re-
jected the defense and held that plaintiffs stated a valid claim under rule
lOb-5. In answering the argument posed by the defendants - that there
had been no deception - the court observed:
if a "deception" is required in the present context, it is fairly found
77 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bard v. Dasho, 389 US. 977 (1967).
78 380 F.2d at 269.
79 Id. at 270.
80 See note 53 supra.
81 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
82 The board action of defendants unanimously authorized the issuance of 100,000
shares to themselves and a few outsiders. 393 F.2d at 867.
83 Id. at 869.
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by viewing this fraud as though the "independent" stockholders
were standing in the place of the defrauded corporate entity.8 4
By viewing the stockholders as the deceived party, Pappas paid homage
to the deception requirement - but did not burden plaintiff with
stringent allegations of causation or deception. This diminution of
deception as a limiting principle further advanced the rights of minority
shareholders.
A Su n ARY OF THE CASE LAW -THE ALTERNATIVEs
Prior to treating the Schoenbaum decision and its ramifications,
it would be beneficial to examine the various approaches to the prob-
lem of management's breach of duty which may be culled from the
Second Circuit's decisions and the views expressed in the Dasho and
Pappas cases.
Upon examination, three distinct approaches may be extracted from
the case law - the rationales of O'Neill, Entel and Pappas each re-
flecting a different jurisprudential resolution of the question of breach
of fiduciary duty. By far, the most restrictive is the view espoused by
Chief Judge Lumbard in O'Neill. 5 While conceding a common-law
action for waste, O'Neill refused to interpose lOb-5 into the daily
affairs of management unless some form of deception was alleged.
The federal judiciary grappled to define the requisite deception, and
Judge Bonsal, who had never been very receptive to plaintiff's suits,
paradoxically expressed the liberal attitude by noting that lOb-5 now
extended to undisclosed breaches of state law. 6 Judge Seitz's opinion
in Pappas not only served to fulfill the deception requirement of
O'Neill but also recognized that, in essence, it was the stockholders,
the real parties in interest, who were being deceived by such acts of
corporate management.87 Thus when Schoenbaum came to the Second
Circuit, the question naturally arose: which way would they go?88
84 Id. Judge Seitz relied upon the Dasho rationale in permitting plaintiff to maintain
his cause of action.
85 889 F.2d at 768.
86 270 F. Supp. at 70.
87 893 F.2d at 869.
88 Professor Bloomenthal suggests that the Schoenbaum court had five ways it could
have handled the problem. In addition to the O'Neill approach (state corporate laws were
applicable), the Pappas approach (shareholders were defrauded), and the Entel approach
(nondisclosure as a breach of fiduciary law), Mr. Bloomenthal posited two more avenues
for resolution: (1) lOb-5 would be inapplicable because the transaction was approved by a
disinterested majority of the directors, and (2) that even absent deception, for con-
trolling shareholders to cause the corporation to issue shares for inadequate consideration
is fraud. Bloomenthal, supra note 56, at 346-47.
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THE SCHOENBAUM DECISION
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrooks9 represents the Second Circuit's con-
sideration of the above discussed alternatives. In Schoenbaum, the court
was confronted with all the problems embraced by the previous cases,
i.e., a breach of fiduciary duty which involved knowledge of all the
directors and a resultant bilking of the corporation's assets. Instead
of adopting previously determined principles, the Schoenbaum court
embarked on uncharted seas and molded new criteria of responsibility
for the corporate community.
Schoenbaum I9
In February 1964, Aquitaine of Canada, Ltd. (Aquitaine), by means
of a tender offer, acquired control of Banff Oil Ltd. (Banff) and placed
three directors on its eight-member board.91 A month later, the two
corporations agreed to conduct joint oil explorations in the Rainbow
Lake Area of Alberta, Canada. In order to alleviate the rising cost
of exploratory drilling, Banff's board of directors, the three Aquitaine
members abstaining, voted to offer Aquitaine 500,000 shares of Banff
treasury stock. Pursuant to Aquitaine's acceptance of the offer, Banff
withheld information concerning the progress of the oil explorations
in order to reduce potential competition for the purchase of land in
the Rainbow Area.92 Subsequently, upon discovering the area was laden
with oil, Banff's board of directors sought to finance construction by
authorizing sales of treasury stock to the Paribas Corporation. The
sales to Aquitaine and Paribas were effectuated at the then prevailing
market prices of the stock. 93 Invoking lOb-594 as the jurisdictional
predicate, plaintiff, a shareholder of Banff, brought a derivative suit
against Aquitaine and Paribas, alleging that the individual defendants,
89405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
Manley v. Schoenbaum, 595 U.S. 906 (1969). See Patrick, Rule lOb-5, Equitable Fraud and
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: Another Step in the Continuing Development of Federal
Corporation Law, 21 ALA. L. REv. 457 (1969) and Comment, Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Involving Full Director Knowledge Held 10b-5 Violation, 1969 DuKE L.J. 283 for treat-
ment of the problems raised in Schoenbaum litigation.
9OIn the interest of clarity, the panel decision (405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.)) and the en
banc consideration (405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)) will be analyzed separately. They will be
entitled Schoenbaum I and Schoenbaum 11 respectively.
91405 F.2d at 204.
92 The withholding of such information was authorized by Alberta law, which permits
the withholding of such facts for one year from completion of exploratory drilling. 405
F.2d at 205. Unlike the situation presented in Texas Gulf, the plaintiff stockholder did
not contend that this failure to disclose was violative of the federal securities laws.
93 500,000 shares were sold to Aquitaine in December 1964 at $1.35 per share; 270,000
shares were negotiated to Paribas in November 1965 at $7.30 per share.
94 The text of rule lOb-5 appears in note 10 supra.
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
directors of Banff, conspired with the corporate defendants to induce
Banff to sell treasury shares at a price which defendants knew did not
adequately represent the true value of the stocks. These transactions
allegedly defrauded Banff of millions of dollars. The district court,
with Judge Cooper presiding, denied plaintiff's request for discovery
and granted summary judgment for the defendant.9 5 On appeal, the
panel court overruled the dismissal on the jurisdictional question, but
affirmed the district court determination that plaintiff did not state
a valid cause of action under rule lOb-5. 96 Chief Judge Lumbard, the
author of the panel court opinion, reasoned that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, Banff's sales must be regarded as arm's length
transactions. With that as a premise, the court employed traditional
agency principles to strike down plaintiff's complaint for failure to
show any deception of the corporation.9 7 Judge Hays, dissenting,
severely criticized the majority's application of wooden agency prin-
ciples to a plain case of fraud.98 Characterizing such principles as a
"trap for the unwary," he stated:
What the majority is actually saying is that since the directors were
the corporation for the purposes of the questioned transactions the
corporation must have known what the directors knew, or, in other
words, the directors knew what the directors knew.99
Schoenbaum II
In the en banc consideration, Judge Hays was vindicated as the
Second Circuit substantially adopted the position he propounded in
the Schoenbaum I dissent.100 The court upheld the 10b-5 claim against
95 268 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The district court ruled that the court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction, and secondarily, that plaintiff failed to sustain a viable
claim under rule lOb-5. Judge Cooper primarily relied upon rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides in pertinent part:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Judge Cooper gave summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff failed to
reply with affidavits based on personal knowledge. 268 F. Supp. at 897.
95 Chief Judge Lumbard and Circuit Court Judges Medina and Hays composed the
Schoenbaum I panel. The three-judge panel believed that the Securities Exchange Act
was endowed with extraterritorial application in order to further protect the American in-
vesting public. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1964). The court felt that such protection was
permitted to persons "involved in isolated foreign transactions." 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 176
(1970). See Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: Towards
a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REV.
1015, 1033-88 (1969).
97"Plaintiff has failed to make the necessary showing that those authorized to act
on behalf of the corporation were deceived or that their knowledge should not be deemed
the corporation's knowledge." 405 F.2d at 213.
98 Id. at 214-15 (Hays, J., dissenting opinion).
99 Id. at 215.
100 The en banc court consisted of Chief Judge Lumbard, Circuit Court Judges
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the individual defendants and Aquitaine, but affirmed the dismissal
of the complaint as to the Paribas Corporation. It is important to note
that between the panel and en banc decisions, the Second Circuit
handed down its momentous decision in Texas Gulf, wherein were
found rumblings that 10b-5 had possibly gone too far in such intimate
management affairs.10'
Confronted with all the alternatives, 0 2 and with the Texas Gulf
result fresh in their minds, the Second Circuit went further than was
necessary in holding defendants liable for fraud in Schoenbaum. Now,
Judge Hays, writing for the en banc court, found two bases for rejecting
the panel court opinion. Upholding plaintiff's allegation "that Aqui-
taine exercised a controlling influence over the issuance to it of
treasury stock of Banff for a wholly inadequate consideration, ' 10 3 the
majority held this to be a practice which would operate as a fraud even
in the absence of deception. 0 4 Approving the Ruckle dicta - that in
certain contexts, such as embezzlement and conflict of interest, a
majority or even an entire board of directors could defraud a corpora-
tion-Judge Hays went beyond a simple deception requirement in
holding that the defendants' conduct was violative of l0b-5.10 The
secondary grounds for sustaining the lOb-5 claim adopted the Pappas
rationale, i.e., defendants deceived the stockholders (the true owners of
the corporation). 0 6 This ratio decidendi would have sufficed to encom-
pass the directors' action under the lOb-5 umbrella, and, at the same
time, would have fulfilled the O'Neill requirement of some form of
deception. However, the primary ground for the result was the conflict
of interest approach, and thus the real significance of the Schoenbaum
decision emerges.' 07
Judge Medina dissented strongly on policy grounds.0 8 Fearing that
Medina, Waterman, Moore, Friendly, Smith, Kaufman, Hays, Anderson and Feinbcrg.
With the exception of Judge Medina, these same judges decided the Texas Gulf litigation
'01 Cf. Judge Friendly's concurrence in Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 864. Judge Friendly
expressed grave doubts about the viability of the Ruckle approach and was of the opinion
that such problems should be handled under state law. Interestingly, however, Judge
Friendly concurred in the Schoenbaum result.
102 See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
'03 405 F.2d at 219.
104 Thus the en banc court relied upon the language of clause three -of rule lOb-5
which stresses fraud practices which occur in the course of business. See note 10 supra
for the precise wording of clause three.
105 889 F.2d at 29.
10 405 F.2d at 220.
107 The significance and implications of Schoenbaum will be discussed at pp. 292-94
infra.
108 Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge Moore concurred in the dissenting opinion. It is
interesting to note that it was Chief Judge Lumbard who authored the O'Neill opinion.
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the decision would bestow upon stockholders the almost unlimited
right to challenge any corporate action when they thought the price
was inadequate, Judge Medina expressed grave concern that this would
"open the floodgates" to federal litigation.109 He assailed the majority
opinion, declaring that such a result amounted to "giving carte blanche
to every holder of a few shares ... to give his imagination full rein""u 0
in trying to invent novel theories of management liability,"" thus in-
creasing the congestion in the federal courts with an inundation of
lOb-5 claims.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCHOENBAUM: CONFLICT OF INTEREST
TO THE FOREFRONT
While it has traditionally been recognized that conflicts of interest
pose knotty problems for corporate personnel, such questions of
propriety were usually considered to be within the purview of state
law.112 Federal securities law had remained "pure" by mandating the
allegation of some form of deception before a breach of management's
fiduciary duty could be considered within the prohibition of lOb-5.
However, an analysis of Schoenbaum will vividly demonstrate the
intrusion of federal law into the deep recesses of state law. 113
This intrusion can be exemplified by comparing the en banc court's
treatment of the Aquitaine and Paribas corporate defendants. It will
be recalled that the court upheld the dismissal of the complaint as to
109 405 F.2d at 220 (Medina, J. dissenting). Paradoxically, it was Judge Medina who
penned the Ruckle opinion.
110 Id. at 221.
111 The judiciary had previously expressed similar displeasure with plaintiff's desire
to invent novel types of management liability. See, e.g., Barnett v. Anaconda, 238 F. Supp.
766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In noting the increasing regularity of minority shareholder
suits initiated under the aegis of the federal securities laws, Judge van Pelt Bryan quoted
Mr. Justice Cardozo: "[n]ot every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that
a federal law is the basis of the suit." Id. quoting Gully v. First Natl Bank, 299 US. 109,
115 (1936).
112 See Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALu. L. Ray. 408 (1962).
Professor Cary professed that the thrust of state law treatment of conflict of interests
is management's failure to disclose adverse interests in transactions with their companies.
See generally Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality,
22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966).
113 For a thorough analysis of state law remedies, see 3 Loss 1631-82; L. Loss &
E. Cowurr, BLUE SKY LAw 129-71 (1958). Recently, a case was decided in a state court in-
volving breach of fiduciary duties. In Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d
210, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), the Court of Appeals for the State of New York unanimously held
that an officer and director are accountable to their corporation for their acts of misconduct
under state law, regardless of any federal liabilities. In so holding, the Court used common-
law theories of fiduciary duty - an area almost preempted by federal legislation. Signifi-
cantly, the Court of Appeals indicated that it was not necessary to show any corporate harm
to recover the profits gained by an insider. Diamond is a refreshing example of state court
activity in corporation law. See Note, Diamond v. Oreamuno: A Fresh Approach to Insider
Trading and The Duties of The Corporate Fiduciary, 31 U. Prrr L. REV. 296 (1969).
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Paribas, stating "there is no reason to believe that Paribas was in any
position to influence the judgment of the Banff directors by any im-
proper means."'11 Impliedly, then, the Second Circuit was adopting a
"position of influence" test to determine the existence of violations of
federal law. The court found such influence on the part of Aquitaine,
who controlled Banff and had placed three members on Banff's board of
directors."15 Eschewing any attempt to articulate how a corporation
could be deceived by all its agents, the court based the lOb-5 violation
on the fact that Aquitaine, Banff's controlling shareholder, caused the
corporation to issue stock for an inadequate consideration -a tradi-
tional breach of fiduciary duty. Hence, the Second Circuit focused on
the question of whether the defendant was in a position to exert "con-
trolling influence" in the transaction.
The new attitude evidenced by the Second Circuit toward
breaches of fiduciary duty virtually eliminates the deception require-
ment in securities cases where one of the parties to the transaction is in
a position to influence the directors. Thus, in Schoenbaum, by permit-
ting the plaintiff to pursue his course of discovery on the mere allega-
tion of potential conflict of interest, the Second Circuit seems to be
recognizing a type of fraud without "deceit."" 86
Schoenbaum is simply the fruition of the federal policy that pro-
tection be afforded to all investors." 7 Of course, this emphasis enhances
the position of minority shareholders. To ensure such investor protec-
tion, the court subtly shifted emphasis from deception to those practices
114 405 F.2d at 219 (en banc).
115 The panel court conceded that a corporation could be defrauded even when all its
directors know all material facts, if there exists a conflict of interests between the
directors and the corporation which would prevent the transmission of relevant informa-
tion to the corporation. However, the panel court noted that the Aquitaine representatives
abstained from voting, and refused to label the transaction as one with "a conflicting
personal interest." 405 F.2d at 212 (panel).
116 This was the position taken by the commentator in Comment, Shoenbaum v.
Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. Rav. 1103,
1116-19 (1969). The commentator postulates that the initial question raised sub rosa
in Schoenbaum is whether minority shareholders are entitled to any special protection
under lOb-5. He concludes that Schoenbaum is the fruition of judicial recognition of the
vulnerability of minority shareholders- since such shareholders can be hurt even though
no deception is involved. "But the Schoenbaum decision illustrates that a corporate in-
vestment decision can also be impaired when directors are controlled by a person having
interests adverse to those of the shareholders." Id. at 1119.
117 At the core of the federal securities law is the desire to make available to the
investing public all the material facts necessary to reach an intelligent investment decision.
Thus, failure to disclose material information amounts to "fraud"; presumably, if the
investor had known all the relevant facts, he would not have participated in the trans-
action. This policy was emphasized in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961),
wherein the Commission stressed "the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing."
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which "operate as a fraud" on the investor. Correlatively, management
personnel were warned that the problems of "conflicts of interests" in the
securities industry were becoming "more acute and more subtle."118
Clearly then, the true spirit of Schoenbaum - the new judicial rec-
ognition of a type of "fraud"119 which impugns the integrity of the
trading process without being deceptive per se - expands "federal
corporation law" further.
CASE LAW AFTER SCHOENBAUM
Although the case law on conflict of interest since Schoenbaum
has been sparse, it nevertheless affirms the new judicial emphasis on
the protection of minority shareholders through recognition of director
conflict of interest as violative of the federal securities laws. For in-
stance, in Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker,120 plaintiff alleged that the
defendant defrauded the corporation of thousands of dollars by nego-
tiating several stock transactions at a loss to the corporation. As in
Schoenbaum, all directors knew the material facts, and, once again,
the court was confronted with the question of when full director
knowledge of material inside information adequately protects the
shareholders from the deceptive practices prohibited by lOb-5.121 The
Southern District Court of New York dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a federal cause of action, but added rather significant
dicta, stating if "all directors are aware of all the facts, but a majority
of the board ... has a conflict of interests in the transaction, share-
holders are not protected."'122 Thus, Penn Mart asserts that if a ma-
jority of the board is controlled by the purchaser or has other con-
flict of interests in the transaction, a lOb-5 action would lie because
the shareholder's interests have not been adequately protected.
In another important case interpreting Schoenbaum, Swanson v.
American Consumer Industries, Inc.,123 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit considered allegations that proxy materials were mis-
leading in that they failed to reveal material information to the
minority shareholders. Judge Cummings, cognizant of a trend toward
more protection of minority shareholder interests by the federal secu-
118 Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Federal Bar Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 29,
1969. The former chairman of the SEC expressed concern over whether lOb-5 can deal
effectively with the problems which are posed by the daily affairs of corporate manage-
ment.
119 See Comment, supra note 116, at 1119.
120 800 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
121 Id. at 735-86.
122 ld. at 786.
123 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969).
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rities laws,124 openly approved the Schoenbaum rationale. Judge Cum-
mings opined that derivative actions are potent weapons against a
corporation whose directors have a conflict of interest and know that
a transaction is injurious to the interests of the corporation.125 The
Seventh Circuit thus impliedly sanctioned the Schoenbaum concept
of fraud.
THE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE
Common Law
To appreciate the underlying complexities which recent federal
case law has created, one must first realize how the common law has
been preempted in the management area. The common-law cause of
action was comprised of the following elements: materiality, misrepre-
sentation, privity, scienter, reliance and damage. 20 The courts evinced
a rather rigorous attitude toward these elements and plaintiffs found
it rather difficult to establish a cause of action. Features such as
scienter, reliance and causation proved particularly troublesome in
securities cases.' 27 lOb-5 claimants, however, have not been compelled
to comply with such a strict standard; 2 thus the attractiveness of a
lOb-5 action, and the concomitant decline of the common-law cause
of action.
State Law
Virtually all states have securities laws protecting investors through
broad prohibitions of fraud. 29 Traditionally, the regulation of cor-
porations, including the fiduciary duties of management, devolved
upon the states through the application of blue sky laws.3 0 However,
124 Id. at 1332-33.
125 Id. at 1853.
126 See BROMBERG § 2.7, at 55; W. PROssER, ToRTs §§ 100, 104 (3d ed. 1964).
127 The common law was slow in discerning the fiduciary obligations of directors and
other insiders to shareholders, thereby heightening the rise of federal law into this area.
Loss, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 918
(1966). BROtBERG § 2.7, at 55.
128 See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1967);
Stevens v. Vowell, 843 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965); Hooper v. Mountain States Sees.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
129State securities laws have been termed "blue sky" laws because of their early
Kansas origin. There, laws were enacted to protect the gullible plainsmen from purchasing
building lots in the "blue sky" from smooth talking promoters. L. Loss & E. Cow=Tr,
supra note 113, at 7. For a compilation of reasons for the promulgation of blue sky laws,
see 14 W. FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIoNs § 6734 (1966). See
also BROMBERG § 2.7(2), at 56-57.
130 See generally Bayne, The Fiduciary Duty of Management: The Concept in the
Courts, 35 U. DEr. LJ. 561 (1958). An example of a state codification of a director's duty
may be found in section 717 of the New York Business Corporation Law which provides
in pertinent part:
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over the years, state regulation did not prove itself entirely satisfac-
tory,131 and Congress responded with the enactment of the securities
acts. In reality, there has been a "federal corporation law" since the
passage of those acts in the early 1930's.132 Aggrieved shareholders have
demonstrated an affinity toward the federal cause of action, 133 opting
to bring their suits under the aegis of federal securities law, despite
the existence of a common-law action for fraud 34 and a state action
for waste or mismanagement. Plaintiffs gravitate toward federal courts
because of diverse advantages, such as jurisdiction, venue, process, in-
vestor sympathy, liberal discovery proceedings, 185 and especially be-
cause the state remedies "rarely have the punch of lob-5."' 36 The
federal judiciary has shown cordiality for plaintiffs' claims without
dearly delineating the elements of a 1Ob-5 action, favoring a flexible
case-by-case approach. 3 7 Thus, the predicament of management per-
sonnel comes to light. Just what actions will the courts consider viola-
tive of lOb-5? What are the standards to which directors will be held?
If lOb-5 is to emerge as the regulator of such intracorporate conduct,
just how effective an instrument is it?
Directors and officers shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in
good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.
13 The factors which manifested the need for federal intervention in securities
regulation include: lack of adequate protective laws in all jurisdictions, a concomitant
lack of uniformity, the possibility of evading state authorities by operating strictly on
an interstate basis, and the generous exemptions offered by the blue sky laws of some
states. E. McCoRMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SEcuRiIs Aar AND THE S.E.C. 12 (1948).
132 Fleischer, supra note 6, at 1179.
133 One of the biggest obstacles confronting shareholder litigation under state law is
the typical "security for expenses" provision, which mandates that a stockholder who owns
a small percentage of the outstanding shares and is bringing a derivative action in behalf of
the corporation, be prepared to give security for the reasonable expenses which may be
incurred by the corporation or other defendant parties. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 834
(West 1955); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 627 (McKinney 1963). Such provisions are conceived
to deter frivolous stockholders suits instituted by individuals who have no substantial
interest in the corporation. See Dalva v. Bailey, 158 F. Supp. 204, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
134 See notes 126-27 and accompanying text supra.
135 Schoenbaum, while embodying a new conceptualization of fraud by the judiciary,
also exemplifies the federal courts' liberal attitude toward discovery proceedings. See
Cohen v. Tenney Corp., 92,722 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1970).
136 BROMBERG § 2.7(2), at 57.
137 The courts have been reluctant to define the exact elements of a 10b-5 cause of
action. Professor Cary, former Chairman of the SEC, has contended that the developments
of such a blueprint of fraud would encourage evasive techniques. Cary, Fleischer &
Halleran, Inside Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1011-12 (1966).
Judicial recognition of the inadvisability of defining all the requisite elements of
fraud was vividly portrayed some 45 years ago in State v. Whiteaker, 118 Ore. 656, 245 P.
1077 (1926). In Whiteaker, which dealt with the issuance of licenses for the sale of
securities and possible violations of blue sky law, Judge Belt deemed it inadvisable to lay
down any hard and fast rule, stating:
Were we to do so, a certain class of gentlemen of the "J. Rufus Wallingford"
type -"they toil not neither do they spin" - would lie awake nights endeavoring
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THE JURISPRUDENTIAL QUESTION
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."u1s These words of the
eminent jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. are indicative of the plight
of his classic "bad man," viz., what is the bad man to expect from the
law - can he adequately judge the standards imposed by the law so as
to evade its proscription? Extrapolating the problem of Holmes' bad
man to the situation of the corporate fiduciary,139 what is the objective
standard of conduct to which management must adhere? If deception
or conflict of interests is to be the standard, how will such a standard
be measured? For it is a fundamental premise, firmly embedded in our
system of jurisprudence, that the citizens are entitled to know what the
law demands.
Does the broad language of rule lOb-5 fulfill this requirement of
due process - i.e., is it sufficiently dear just what conduct is pro-
scribed by the rule? If the answer is in the negative, is further legisla-
tion by Congress in the securities area the solution?
UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE MANAGEMENT AREA
To further illustrate the problems of the corporate fiduciary, the
emergence of 1Ob-5 as the most effective weapon in the investor's
arsenal has subjected many types of corporate action to attack.140 For
example, insider seizure of corporate opportunities, insider misuse of
corporate assets for self-aggrandizement, insider sale of corporate con-
trol at a premium price, insider manipulation of combinations to
cause mergers which are patently unfair to minority shareholders, and
insider issuance of stock or options at unfair prices are illustrative of
the conduct which has been held to violate lOb-5. Typically, plaintiff's
claim alleges that a management fiduciary duty has been breached,
and that as a result of such breach, plaintiff has suffered injury.
Since the federal courts have proven receptive to the investor's di-
lemma, the effects on the general business community, and manage-
ment in particular, cannot be underestimated. For, as more and more
to conceive some devious and shadowy way of evading the law. It is more
advisable to deal with each case as it arises.
Id. at 661, 247 P. at 1079. See also Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205, 210-11 (8th Cir.
1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 674 (1934). See discussion at note 155 infra.
138 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 H.xv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).
139 The analogy between Holmes' "bad man" and the corporate fiduciary is for
comparative purposes only.
140 For an analysis of the types of corporate action subject to lob-5 attack and a
discussion of the leading cases, see Ruder, Challenging Corporate Action Under Rule
1Ob-5, 25 Bus. LAW. 75 (1969).
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management activity has come under the scrutiny of the federal judi-
ciary, the delineation of meaningful standards has not kept pace with
the expanding jurisdiction exercised by the federal courts. As a result
of such decisions as Texas Gulf, Pappas, Dasho, and especially Schoen-
baum, certain factual situations are in further need of clarification by
the courts. 141 For example, if recipients of stock know that in return for
the stock, the corporation is receiving inadequate consideration and
the transaction is approved by a disinterested board of directors, can
1Ob-5 be effectively invoked by the aggrieved shareholders? Similarly,
if the executive committee of a corporation issues stock options for
inadequate consideration, but for improper motives, are they within
the prohibitions of lOb-5? More hypotheticals could be posed where,
for example, the majority of an executive committee knows of material
information and the recipient does not, or only a minority of the com-
mittee is aware of such information. Additional problems can be seen
in the fluid merger market. For instance, must proposed acquisitions
be heralded to the public in advance? If such acquisitions are heralded
and the stock market thwarts the transaction, are the directors liable?
Conversely, if the directors decide to withhold notification, can they
be held liable for failing to provide the public with an opportunity
to buy?142
Closely allied with these hypothetical situations is the question of
deception and the Ruckle-O'Neill controversy. 143 Has lOb-5 become
so expansive as to include any breach of fiduciary duty?144 The Schoen-
baum result, representing a new type of "fraud,"' 45 would seem to
dilute the deception requirement, but would still require some mini-
mal allegation of conflict of interest before lOb-5 becomes operative.
However, is such a standard, i.e., conflict of interest, as interpreted by
the courts, a viable one? The hypotheticals involving corporate mis-
management illustrate that problems still remain and the question is
simply reduced to this: should the concepts continue to be explored
141 See Bloomenthal, supra note 56, at 354-58.
142 Perhaps the best advice that can be given to directors faced with this dilemma is
complete disclosure. The public and private interests are best served when an accurate
and continuous flow of information is made available to the public. If directors heed this
advice, the underlying philosophy of the securities acts will be served -that an investing
public be informed fairly. Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Baltimore Security Analysts
Society, Baltimore, Maryland, in (1967-1969 Transfer Binder), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
77,652, at 83,415 (Jan. 6, 1969).
143 See notes 38-47 and accompanying text supra.
144 It will be recalled that this was the extreme position espoused by Judge Bonsai in
Entel. However, the Schoenbaum disposition of the corporate defendant Paribas would
seem to indicate a judicial reluctance to adopt the Entel position.
145 See Comment, note 116 supra.
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and advanced through judicial decisions or should legislation inter-
vene?
LEGISLATIVE REVISION?
Legislative Background
At the root of the intrusion of rule 1Ob-5 into management affairs
is the notion that the securities acts never purported to be a compre-
hensive "federal corporation law." In fact, the Securities Act of 1933140
was geared toward providing the public with pertinent investor infor-
mation, and section 17147 was the general prohibition against fraud by
sellers of a security. A year later, Congress enacted section 10(b) of the
1934 Act,148 empowering the SEC to promulgate rules prohibiting
deceptive devices or schemes in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities. In 1942, pursuant to this grant of congressional authority,
the SEC promulgated rule 1Ob-5 to prohibit fraudulent practices by
purchasers of securities, thus closing the loophole left open by sec-
tion 17.141
With the private right of action recognized in Kardon, an Act
initially limited in scope assumed a new dimension, and since 1946,
that dimension has been developed almost exclusively by the federal
judiciary. Professor Painter appropriately summarized the problem
when he wrote: "what may be essentially a legislative task is being
gradually transformed into a task which courts are performing under
the stimulus of an administrative agency."'150
THE SouRcEs OF CLARIFICATION
Professor Painter's quote concerning the regulation of manage-
ment highlights the agents of possible clarification: Congress, the judi-
ciary, or the SEC as the administrative agency.151 Whether the judiciary
should have asserted such a dominant role in the development of
"federal corporation law" is academic - for it is a fait accompli. What
is of critical importance now is whether the judiciary should continue
to amplify on management liability -or whether legislative revision
of the various fraud provisions of the securities acts is now in order.152
The most cogent argument for legislative revision at the present
146 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1964).
1471Id. § 77q (1964).
148 Id. § 78j(b) (1964).
3.49 SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
150 W. PAINTE , FEmiAL RiEGULATION OF INsiDER TRADING 298 (1968).
151 See Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule 10-57, 24 Bus. LAw. 69 (1968).
152 Fleischer, supra note 6, at 1178-79. As far back as 1965, MIr. Fleischer suggested
that legislative revision may be appropriate. The question is: is now an appropriate time?
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time is the national character of the securities industry. Such revision
would afford the opportunity for a more exhaustive study of the prob-
lems than is possible in the courts. The very nature of legislative enact-
ment- intense public scrutiny, extensive hearings, congressional de-
bate, and finally, legislative action- seems to lend itself to a more
definitive standard of conduct than has been heretofore delineated
by the courts.1 3 In addition, one might cogently contend that the
courts are presently enforcing standards which are no longer appli-
cable to the large corporation or to a society which is considerably
more complex than the simple society in which those standards were
first formulated.
The federal judiciary, as a source of clarification, would clearly
prove inadequate. Indeed, it is the very fact that corporate fiduciary
duties have been defined by the federal district and circuit courts that
has given rise to the problems of corporate personnel. The discordant
application of the federal securities laws and the exercise of expansive
jurisdiction has led to conflict within the federal judiciary. To hope
that that judiciary could evolve meaningful standards for director
liability in the near future would be optimistic.
Perhaps the Supreme Court could author a unifying theory of
liability, but it has evidenced little inclination to clarify the corporate
law field by developing a comprehensive system of civil liability.
The last possible source of clarification is the SEC itself. Since it
created rule lOb-5 in 1942, it would only seem appropriate that now,
in 1970, the Commission rewrite it to amplify the concepts initially
set forth in it.154 The simple language of the rule has given rise to
numerous problems. If the SEC utilized its expertise and sophistica-
L53 Mr. David Henkel, a noted securities practitioner, has written that even though
most of the securities law has been developed by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis,
this does not mean that the Congress should not prescribe appropriate standards
to guide the courts, practitioners, securities dealers and investors in this area.
Loss, supra note 127, at 867.
154 In regard to the problems of management liability, Professor Knauss has suggested
an interesting solution to the dilemma of enormous potential liability. It is Knauss'
theory that no individual recoveries should be allowed to shareholders; rather, the SEC
should take affirmative action and impose internal sanctions on the company involved.
Such sanctions could largely be accomplished through the investigatory authority of the
Commission. Mr. Knauss also recommends more SEC activity in seeking injunctive
remedies in the federal courts. Correlatively, he urges that the courts should adopt a more
flexible position, attempting to meet the particular type of fraud involved in each
instance. As part of its injunction, the SEC should seek restitution for profits realized by
guilty insiders. And finally, if the Commission finds willful violations of the securities laws,
it should not hesitate to institute criminal sanctions. As can be seen, this approach casts
a heavy burden on the SEC to enforce lOb-5, an approach which has not been fully
accepted by the SEC itself. Knauss, Disclosure Requirements- Changing Concepts of
Liability, 24 Bus. LAw. 43, 57-59 (1968).
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tion, perhaps a more meaningful rule would result. Paradoxically,
however, the SEC has not shown the desire to do so and apparently is
content in allowing the judiciary to develop lOb-5 liability.
Analysis of the possible sources of standardization results in a
circuitous trip. No doubt, a meaningful effort' by Congress to select
the best from lOb-5 jurisprudence would go a long way in solving the
problems which the broad language of rule lOb-5 presents. And pre-
dictably, a study of the leading securities specialists throughout the
nation indicates that the long-range answer must come from the
legislative realm. 5  With the mounting concern which Congress has
recently evinced in the corporate law realm,'"5 the long-hoped for
solution to the subtle and complex problem of management liability
may not be long in coming. lOb-5 will continue to be amplified by
the judiciary on an ad hoc basis until public clamor for codification
reaches the pressure point for Congress. Perhaps Professor Loss was
regrettably correct when he concluded: "[i]n short, one mustn't expect
too much in the lOb-5 area by way of codification."' 57 It can only be
hoped that this expectation will be short-lived.
CONCLUSION
The judicial recognition of "conflict of interest" as violative of
the federal securities laws undoubtedly resulted from "an awareness
of a developing public mandate that executives conform to high stan-
dards of conduct."' 58 However, such an elusive "standard" of cor-
porate conduct opens new vistas for disgruntled shareholders and
raises subtle questions of propriety for high-echelon corporate per-
sonnel. 19
155 Loss, note 127 supra. The overwhelming majority of securities experts favor a
legislative revision of the fraud provisions of the securities acts. But see Lowenfels,
Codification and Rule 10b-5, 23 VAND. L. REv. 591 (1970). It is Mr. Lowenfels' contention
that the expansive growth of rule lOb-5 has truly served the public interest. As a step in
the furtherance of protecting the investing public, Mr. Lowenfels feels codification would
be an inhibiting factor and concludes
hf] raud has many faces, many forms, and many names. Placed in the context of
highly sophisticated securities markets, fraud can be regulated only by thejudiciary, pragmatically, on a case by case basis.
Id. at 597.
156 Such concern is evidenced by the recent promulgation of the Williams Act. Here,
federal legislation was enacted to protect management from the aggressive practices of
corporate raiders and to combat the recent conglomerate phenomena. Congress laid heavy
emphasis on the goal of the act: investor protection. See Note, Closing the Disclosure Gap
in Corporate Take-Overs: The Williams Amendments And The Wheat Report, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 484 (1970).
157 Loss, supra note 13, at 34-35.
158 Cary, supra note 112, at 417.
159 This was the thrust of Judge Medina's dissent in Schoenbaum II. Fearing more
congestion in the federal courts, Judge Medina sharply criticized the majority's rationale
that the mere circumstance of a "controlling interest" permits a shareholder to probe
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At the core of corporate uncertainty has been the expansive use
of rule lOb-5 as a jurisdictional predicate in probing the intracor-
porate affairs of management. The history of lOb-5 has been the devel-
opment of limiting doctrines,160 e.g., the purchaser-seller requirement
of Birnbaum, the deception mandate of O'Neill and the causation
prescription of Barnett. Such doctrines were initially formulated by
the judiciary to limit the potentially unlimited growth of 1Ob-5. How-
ever, the failure to articulate a definitive standard of conduct, as well
as the judicial emphasis on investor and market protection, has posed
an awesome burden for directors and similar officials. 161 1Ob-5 has
emerged as the predominant regulator of intimate management affairs,
and through such decisions as Texas Gulf and Schoenbaum, has forged
a new framework of director liability. One can only wonder, however,
if the result reached in Schoenbaum will ultimately lead to more prob-
lems than it has solved. The major weakness of the implementation
of lOb-5 in the daily affairs of management is that it is highly doubtful
that it was ever intended to regulate such affairs. And the increasing
reliance by the judiciary on rule lOb-5 to solve fiduciary problems
can only result in further confusion in the area.
Undoubtedly, the goal of a "pure" securities industry is laudable.
Through continued judicial emphasis on full and complete disclosure,
insiders will be further deterred from abusing their position of trust.
By recognizing fraud without deceit, the courts have evinced a more
liberal attitude toward securities-related frauds within the corporate
framework. The significance of such an expansion cannot be under-
estimated; the effects on the corporate community cannot be accurately
predicted. This clear judicial trend in the regulation of internal affairs,
although not foreseen or anticipated by Congress 35 years ago, will
serve to further the broad purposes embodied in the securities acts
and in the rules protecting the investing public. While the concepts of
insider liability should be further explored by the judiciary on an
ad hoc basis, legislative clarification is the long-range solution to an
already strained interpretation of rule 1Ob-5.
corporate motives through full discovery proceedings. Such a situation, he concluded, is
"a standing invitation to blackmail and extortion." 405 F.2d at 221.
160 See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 584 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
161 In Herpich v. Wallace, 92,714 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 99,152-53 (5th Cir. July 14,
1970), Circuit Judge Ainsworth put the problem in perspective.
In the formulation of relief, however, concepts of fairness to those who are
expected to govern their conduct under Rule lOb-5 should be considered.
Protection for investors is of primary importance, but it must be kept in mind
that the nation's welfare depends upon the maintenance of a viable, vigorous
business community. Considered alone, the sweeping language of Rule lOb-5
creates an almost completely undefined liability.
